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52Abstract—Predictive coding is possibly one of the most
inﬂuential, comprehensive, and controversial theories of
neural function. While proponents praise its explanatory
potential, critics object that key tenets of the theory are
untested or even untestable. The present article critically
examines existing evidence for predictive coding in the
auditory modality. Speciﬁcally, we identify ﬁve key assump-
tions of the theory and evaluate each in the light of animal,
human and modeling studies of auditory pattern process-
ing. For the ﬁrst two assumptions – that neural responses
are shaped by expectations and that these expectations
are hierarchically organized – animal and human studies
provide compelling evidence. The anticipatory, predictive
nature of these expectations also enjoys empirical support,
especially from studies on unexpected stimulus omission.
However, for the existence of separate error and prediction
neurons, a key assumption of the theory, evidence is lack-
ing. More work exists on the proposed oscillatory signa-
tures of predictive coding, and on the relation between
attention and precision. However, results on these latter
two assumptions are mixed or contradictory. Looking to
the future, more collaboration between human and animal
studies, aided by model-based analyses will be needed to
test speciﬁc assumptions and implementations of predictive
coding – and, as such, help determine whether this popular
grand theory can fulﬁll its expectations.
This article is part of a Special Issue entitled: Sequence
Processing.  2017 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier
Ltd on behalf of IBRO. This is an open access article under
the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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INTRODUCTION
How does the brain make sense of the world? A popular
theory addressing this question is predictive coding
(PC). Simply put, PC states that the brain infers what is
‘out there’ by constantly predicting what is out there,
and then improving those predictions. More technically,
PC proposes that the brain constructs a hierarchical,
generative model of the world – a model capable of
generating patterns of activity ‘from the top-down’ that
external stimuli would elicit ‘from the bottom-up’. The
perceiving brain continuously tries to ‘ﬁt’ such models by
predicting the incoming sensory input. Bad ﬁts signal
prediction errors that leverage increasingly accurate
estimates (recognition); and, over time, a modiﬁed
model (perceptual learning).
As a biological basis for Bayesian theories of
perception and cognition, PC oﬀers compelling
explanations for phenomena from psychology (Knill and
Pouget, 2004) neuroanatomy (Friston, 2005) and electro-
physiology (Rao and Ballard, 1999). Hailed by some as
providing a ‘grand uniﬁed theory of the brain’ (Friston,
2010) the framework has drawn a considerable amount
of attention (Hohwy, 2013; Clark, 2013, 2016). But predic-
tive coding faces many challenges. By ascribing a centralons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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8 August 2017role to top-down expectations of bottom-up inputs, PC
advocates a radical break with traditional feed-forward
accounts of perception. A break, some worry, too radical
since core tenets of the theory are, at best, untested
(Egner and Summerﬁeld, 2013) or, at worst, untestable
(Kogo and Trengove, 2015).
Initially, PC was conceptualized in the context of
visual processing (Rao and Ballard, 1999; Lee and
Mumford, 2003). However, the auditory system quickly
became a popular test bed, with many studies capitalizing
on the auditory Mismatch Negativity (MMN; Na¨a¨ta¨nen
et al., 1978, 2007), perhaps the most well-studied neural
signature of surprise or error processing. The present
review critically evaluates the evidence for PC in auditory
cortex. In keeping with this Special Issue, we will limit our-
selves to relatively low-level auditory patterns (as
opposed to e.g. speech and language; but see Arnal
et al., 2011; Sohoglu et al., 2012; Gagnepain et al.,
2012). There exist several recent reviews of predictive
representation in audition (Winkler and Schro¨ger, 2015;
Schro¨ger et al., 2014, 2015; Winkler and Czigler, 2012;
Winkler et al., 2009). In contrast, the present analysis
speciﬁcally attempts to delineate key assumptions shared
by diﬀerent PC models (cf. Rao and Ballard, 1999; Rao,
2005; Friston, 2005, 2010; Bastos et al., 2012;
Spratling, 2008a,b, 2010; see Spratling, 2015 for review)
and assess whether these assumptions are supported by
empirical evidence in the auditory modality.
In the next section we will brieﬂy recap these basic
assumptions and their empirical ramiﬁcations, before
evaluating them in more detail in the light of recent
evidence.125
Fig. 1. Diﬀerent arrangements of error and expectation neurons in auditor
Columns denote hierarchically arranged cortical columns corresponding to p
standard PC (left), errors ﬂow upward and predictions downward; error units
units with deep layers (V/VI). Prediction units at higher levels can suppre
connections (black circles). In Biased Competition models of PC (Spratling, 20
at input layer IV, prediction units suppress error units only via intracolumnar in
Please note that this schematic is intended to illustrate diﬀerences in laminar p
the distinction between excitatory and inhibitory populations, and between hid
models, and possible physiological mappings, see Shipp (2016), Bastos et al
was adapted from Winer (1985).
Please cite this article in press as: Heilbron M, Chait M. Great expectations: Is
(2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroscience.2017.07.061PREDICTIVE CODING IN CORTEX –
FOUNDATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS
Sensory cortex is organized hierarchically. At each
processing level, neurons integrate information from
multiple neurons at the level below, thus encoding
increasingly abstract information over ever larger
temporal and spatial scales. But cortex is reciprocally
connected, so neurons also receive input from the level
above (Felleman and van Essen, 1991).
Traditionally, higher levels were assumed only to
modulate lower levels, e.g. by prioritizing the processing of
certain inputs over others. But in PC, following the
proposal by Mumford (1992), the abstract information at
higher levels informs and potentially drives neurons at lower
levels by signaling a (prior) ‘best guess’ of their activity. At
the lower level, the diﬀerence between the predicted and
actual activity elicits a prediction error that is propagated
back to the level above, where it is used to generate a new
and improved (posterior) estimate. This routine is repeated,
simultaneously throughout the hierarchy, until themost likely
estimate is reached and the stimulus is perceived.
In this scheme – arguably the standard version of PC
(Rao and Ballard, 1999; Friston, 2005; Bastos et al.,
2012) – a strict cortical asymmetry exists between back-
ward connections (carrying predictions) and forward con-
nections (carrying prediction errors). Since forward
connections originate in superﬁcial (II/III) pyramidal neu-
rons, and backward connections originate in deep (V/VI)
pyramidal neurons (Felleman and van Essen, 1991) this
asymmetry has a straightforward anatomical conse-
quence: prediction neurons reside in deep layers, and
error neurons in superﬁcial layers (Fig. 1).y cortex implied by diﬀerent formulations of Predictive Coding (PC).
rimary (A1), secondary (A2) and higher order (An) auditory areas. In
are therefore identiﬁed with superﬁcial layers (II/III) and expectation
ss error units at lower levels via (poly-synaptic) top-down inhibitory
09; right), expectations ﬂow upward and downward, error is computed
hibition, and top-down connections are fully excitatory (black arrows).
roﬁles only. For simplicity, various details have been omitted, such as
den causes and hidden states. For a more detailed exposition of the a
. (2012), and Spratling (2009, 2017). Laminar image of auditory cortex
there evidence for predictive coding in auditory cortex?. Neuroscience
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8 August 2017Note that this ‘standard model’ is not the only
implementation of PC. Other models propose diﬀerent
arrangements, some dispensing with the functional
asymmetry between forward and backward connections,
and locating prediction and error neurons diﬀerently
(Spratling, 2008a,b, 2010; SeeFig. 1).However, all formula-
tions assume that predictions and errors are computed by
separate neurons in diﬀerent cortical layers – as such, pre-
diction and error responses are assumed to have distinct
laminar proﬁles.
In PC, attention is formalized as a process that infers the
level of predictability of sensory inputs. Again, models diﬀer
in details (Feldman and Friston, 2010; Rao, 2005; Spratling,
2008a,b, 2010) but all conceptualize attention as theweight-
ing of sensory signals by their precision (inverse variance).
The brain thus not only generates (ﬁrst-order) predictions
about the content of a signal, but also generates (second-
order) estimates about its reliability.When this is low, devi-
ations are down-weighted and may go unnoticed; when it is
high, deviations are ampliﬁed and prioritized for further pro-
cessing. Physiologically, this is thought to be implemented
by the post-synaptic gain on superﬁcial (error or prediction)
neurons tuned to the attended dimension (e.g. feature-
based or spatial attention).
Finally, diﬀerent PC-variables are sometimes
associated with diﬀerent cortical rhythms: error cells are
thought to propagate their messages forward via the
gamma-band (>30 Hz), while deep layers send
downward predictions via lower, especially beta-band
(12–30 Hz), frequencies (Arnal and Giraud, 2012;
Bastos et al., 2012). Since this assumption is based on
known oscillatory diﬀerences between forward and back-
ward signals (e.g. van Kerkoerle et al., 2014) it only
applies to standard PC, which postulates a strict func-
tional asymmetry between backward connections (carry-
ing predictions) and forward connections (carrying errors).
In sum, PC makes a number of key assumptions with
clear empirical consequences:230
231
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P
((1) Sensory cortex implements a hierarchical, gen-233
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252erative model of the world: neurons at higher
processing stages generate predictions that bias
processing at lower levels.
(2) Population responses (i.e. gross activity measured
with MEG, EEG or BOLD) reﬂect (at least in part)
‘transient expressions of prediction error’ (Friston,
2005, p.829) – therefore, neural responses should
be shaped by (hierarchically nested) expectations.
(3) Prediction-generation and error-detection are
implemented by separate neural subpopulations
that reside in diﬀerent cortical layers – as a con-
sequence, prediction and error computations
should have distinct laminar profiles.
(4) Attention is the weighting of sensory input by its
reliability – accordingly, thegainonupwardprojec-
tions should reﬂect (estimated) sensory precision.
(5) In standard PC, top-down predictions and
bottom-up errors have distinct oscillatory pro-
ﬁles: predictions are conveyed via lower frequen-
cies (mostly beta) and (precision-weighted)
prediction errors via higher frequencies (gamma).lease cite this article in press as: Heilbron M, Chait M. Great expectations: Is
2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroscience.2017.07.061In the next sections, we will evaluate each assumption
in the light of recent evidence.
ence xxx (2017) xxx–xxx 3253ANIMAL STUDIES
Prediction in auditory cortical neurons
Most animal research on auditory prediction and surprise
focusses on Stimulus Speciﬁc Adaptation (SSA). SSA
refers to the selective attenuation of responses to
repeated (common) stimuli and can be seen as a single-
cell analog of MMN. Although their exact relation
remains debated, SSA is probably not a direct substrate
of MMN, since the phenomena diﬀer in latencies,
NMDA-dependence, and sensitivity to certain
regularities (Khouri and Nelken, 2015). There is a large lit-
erature on SSA, most of which is beyond the scope of this
review as it does not address key features of PC such as
prediction (but see Khouri and Nelken, 2015 for review).
Interestingly, it is unclear whether SSA, despite what
the name implies, is caused by simple adaptation.
Ulanovsky et al. (2004) showed that SSA – here deﬁned
as the diﬀerence in responses to the same sound pre-
sented with diﬀerent probabilities – depended not just
on local context but also on a longer stimulus history,
beyond the order of seconds at which habituation pro-
cesses like synaptic depression are thought to occur.
Moreover, SSA is observable for tones with frequency dif-
ferences smaller than typical tuning curves, which also
cannot be explained by models of synaptic habituation
(Taaseh et al., 2011; Yaron et al., 2012).
Recently, Rubin et al. (2016) re-analyzed the data
from Ulanovsky et al. (2004), in a ﬁrst attempt to quantify
the longer-term dependencies. Anesthetized cats were
exposed to ‘Bernouli sequences’ with two tones occurring
independently with a ﬁxed probability. The authors rea-
soned that some representation of (long-term) stimulus
history inﬂuenced responses; moreover, this representa-
tion was not a one-to-one copy but a reduced representa-
tion. Assuming that only stimulus probability was
represented, rather than transitional probability (but see
Meyniel et al., 2016; Mittag et al., 2016) the authors com-
puted the predictive power of representations reduced to
a diﬀerent degree. The key assumption here was that
responses reﬂected prediction error, expressed as nega-
tive log probability. The prediction error account oﬀered
good ﬁts, explaining up to 50% of observed variability.
Interestingly, representations incorporating less than 10
preceding stimuli (7.3 s) were almost never in the top
10% with the most power. The authors concluded that
neurons in A1 signal prediction errors, based on reduced
representations incorporating long-term stimulus history
‘to generate predictions about the future’ (2016, p.2).
Although the authors are agnostic about the underlying
mechanism – which may or may not resemble schemes
envisioned by PC – the interpretation forms a departure
from earlier accounts of SSA, which (as the name sug-
gests) tend to focus on stimulus-driven explanations such
as synaptic depression.
More fundamental insights are presented by Gill et al.
(2008) who explored surprise as a model for auditory
receptive ﬁelds. At several levels in the Zebra Finch audi-there evidence for predictive coding in auditory cortex?. Neuroscience
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8 August 2017tory hierarchy, the authors compared three receptive ﬁeld
models: ﬁrst, a traditional approach modeling neurons as
responding to speciﬁc spectrotemporal patterns of intensi-
ties (STRF); secondly, a derivative approach, modeling
changes in intensities; ﬁnally, a model describing neurons
as responding to surprise, quantiﬁed as the inverse condi-
tional probability of a range of frequencies, given the pre-
ceding frequencies, based on naturalistic Zebra Finch
song. This ‘surprise model’ substantially outperformed
traditional models. Interestingly, its advantage depended
on hierarchical level: in area MLD (homolog of inferior col-
liculus) models did not diﬀer signiﬁcantly. In ﬁeld L (homo-
log of thalamorecipient neurons in A1) surprise was 20%
better than STRF models on average. And in CLM (homo-
log of higher-order auditory cortex) the surprise model
performed a striking 67% better on average. The authors
concluded that expectations are increasingly important at
higher levels, leading to an ever sparser neural code that
eventually only propagates input not expected on the
basis of preceding input. The authors stress that these
‘expectations’ were based on very short preceding time
windows (3–7 ms), and that the eﬀect is thus not a direct
substrate of high-level (conscious) ‘surprise’. The paper is
also silent on how the expectations are implemented. But
it does show that, at a fundamental level, ‘expectations . . .
form a key part of the [auditory] neural code’ (2008 p.,
218).
The laminar proﬁle of prediction
Laminar diﬀerences between prediction and error signals
(Assumption 3) are a key tenet of predictive coding
theories. This important notion remains woefully under-
studied; we have only found two papers relevant to this
assumption. The ﬁrst is by Szymanski et al. (2009), who
studied the laminar proﬁle of SSA in rat auditory cortex
using an oddball paradigm. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the ﬁrst auditory study comparing laminar proﬁles
for expected and unexpected stimuli. Remarkably, their
results seemed opposite to what PC predicts: the authors
found no clear diﬀerences between layers. In all layers,
neurons responded more strongly to deviants than to
the same stimulus when it was a standard (SSA). If any-
thing, this diﬀerence seemed to be stronger for deeper
layers. If SSA is an expression of prediction error, this
eﬀect seems to contradict PC schemes that identify deep
layers as ‘prediction layers’. It is worth noting, however,
that the rats where anesthetized with ketamine, an
NMDA-antagonist that, probably by blocking NMDA-
dependent plasticity, impairs MMN (Umbricht et al.,
2002) and abolishes global mismatch responses (Uhrig
et al., 2016) leading to a pattern of eﬀects that has been
interpreted (Strauss et al., 2015) as a ‘disruption of pre-
dictive coding’ (see Section Expectation and surprise
along the auditory hierarchy).
A recent study in awake animals did ﬁnd strong
laminar-speciﬁc eﬀects. The authors (Rummell et al.,
2016) trained mice to press a lever that generated noise
bursts. Every 5–10 s the bursts were also generated ran-
domly, allowing the researchers to compare responses to
the same sound when it was self-generated and when it
occurred randomly (Fig. 2A). Clear attenuation ofPlease cite this article in press as: Heilbron M, Chait M. Great expectations: Is
(2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroscience.2017.07.061responses to self-generated sounds was observed in pri-
mary auditory cortex, replicating non-invasive work in
humans (Baess et al., 2009). The predictive, stimulus-
speciﬁc nature of this eﬀect was conﬁrmed when the
authors replaced the noise bursts by pure tones that
had one frequency in 75% of trials and another in 25%.
Responses to common (‘expected’) self-generated
sounds were attenuated more strongly – suggesting that
auditory cortex embodied a stimulus-speciﬁc expectation
of the generated sound. Multi-site recordings from audi-
tory thalamus, auditory cortex and hippocampus revealed
increasing attenuation, often resulting in near-silencing in
hippocampus (see Fig. 3). This again points to a familiar
picture of the auditory hierarchy in which predictable com-
ponents are progressively ‘ﬁltered out’.
Intriguingly however, the authors found that
attenuation was much stronger in deep layers. This
again seems to contradict the idea that deep layers
encode predictions, since it should be the error that is
suppressed. Conclusions should be drawn with care,
however, since predicting the sensory consequences of
motor commands may be very diﬀerent from sensory
prediction in general, so that evidence for the one (see
Eliades and Wang, 2008; Keller and Hahnloser, 2009
for earlier evidence for auditory eﬀerence copy) is not
necessarily evidence for the other.
Finally, Jaramillo and Zador (2011) studied expecta-
tion in rat auditory cortex. Rats were presented a train
of short pure tones containing a frequency-modulated tar-
get. The target, which appeared either ‘early’ (450 ms) or
‘late’ (1500 ms), signaled if the correct (rewarded)
response was right or left. Expectation was manipulated
over blocks in which the target appeared early in 85% of
trials and late in 15%, or vice versa. Behaviorally, rats
responded faster and more accurately to targets appear-
ing at the expected time-window. Expectation also modu-
lated single-unit and LFP responses, and this modulation
correlated with performance. For both the preceding stim-
ulus and the target itself, expectation increased rather
than attenuated the neural response, which apparently
contradicts the notion that neurons signal surprise. How-
ever, the stimulus of which expectancy was manipulated,
was also the target. As such, prediction (what is likely?)
and attention (what is relevant?) are confounded. This
confound characterizes many common paradigms,
including the classic Posner task (Posner, 1980), where
attention is controlled by manipulating probability
(Fig. 2B). In such situations, PC makes similar predictions
as conventional accounts of attention: enhanced gain on
the relevant (informative) feature, which is prioritized for
processing. Hence, to distinguish assumptions of PC,
attention and prediction must be manipulated indepen-
dently (see Section Expectation and surprise along the
auditory hierarchy).
Discussion
In sum, animal-model studies relevant to the assumptions
of predictive coding are scarce and show mixed results.
None of the discussed studies explicitly tested PC,
which may contribute to the inconclusiveness of the
results. Nevertheless, they report some remarkablethere evidence for predictive coding in auditory cortex?. Neuroscience
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Fig. 2. Paradigms often used in the literature to study the eﬀects of context and predictability on behavioral and brain responses. In the schematic
representations below colored squares represent sounds. (A) The ‘Self-Generated vs. Random sounds’ paradigm compares responses to sounds
when they are self-generated (triggered by a button press; and therefore predictable) or randomly generated by a computer (and therefore
unpredictable; a). Another version of the paradigm (b) compares self-generated sounds (triggered by a button press) to omissions (when the
participant pressed the button but no sound was presented). (B) The ‘Posner paradigm’ is a class of experimental designs where a ‘cue’, which can
be implemented as speciﬁc stimulus or a context which is induced during the experimental session, that predicts the target with a certain probability.
The paradigm therefore allows to measure responses to the target as a function of its predictability. (C) The standard MMN Oddball paradigm
involves the presentation of a repeating standard tone, occasionally replaced by a deviant tone. (D) The standard MMN omission paradigm is similar
to the Oddball paradigm except the deviant tone is replaced by silence. (E) The Roving standard paradigm is a variation of the oddball paradigm that
replaces the deviant stimulus with a variable standard. After a number of repetitions, the standard changes, creating a ‘deviant’ that becomes a
‘standard’ – while remaining physically identical. (F) The unexpected repetition paradigm consists of pairs of sounds that are infrequently replaced
by a repetition. The schematic here shows a simple version of the paradigm where the tone pairs consist of the same sounds, but instances where
diﬀerent pairs are presented are also used. (G) The ‘Repetition vs. Expectation’ paradigm is used to dissociate the eﬀects of prediction from simple
eﬀects of repetition. The paradigm depicted here was used in Todorovic and de Lange (2012). The stimulus set consisted of 3 diﬀerent tones
(illustrated here by the use of diﬀerent colors) arranged in pairs but such that the ﬁrst tone in a pair was predictive of the second one. For example
tone1 (green) was predictive of tone2 (blue) in 75% of the trials but was occasionally (in 25% of the trials) followed by tone2 (purple). Tone2 (blue)
was predictive of an omission but which was replaced in 25% of the trials by tone 3 (green), etc. (H) The Local/Global paradigm is designed to
dissociate responses to local deviants from responses to global deviants. In the example depicted here the stimulus consists of ‘standard’
(commonly occurring) and ‘oddball’ (rarely occurring) sequences. The last tone in each ‘standard’ sequence is a local deviant; In contrast, ‘global
deviance’ is manifested here by the absence of change. A similar approach with expected and unexpected tone omissions is also commonly used.
(I) The ‘Emergence of regularity’ (RAND-to-REG) paradigm introduced by Barascud et al. (2016) is based on rapid tone-pip sequences which
contain transitions from a random (RAND) frequency pattern (in yellow) to a regularly repeating (REG; predictable) frequency pattern (in orange). In
this example the REG pattern consists of a cycled sequence of 4 diﬀerent tones.
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8 August 2017ﬁndings. Firstly, in support of Assumption 2, expectation
appears to shape neural responses in auditory cortex.
Surprise – both task-based at timescales of several
seconds (Rubin et al., 2016), and species-based at time-
scales of milliseconds (Gill et al., 2008) – oﬀers a good
model for neural responsiveness. The methodological dif-
ferences between these studies, and the fact that both did
not address the mechanisms of prediction, unfortunately
limit their conclusiveness with respect to PC. However,
both studies make the conceptual shift from charac-
terizing neurons as encoding bottom-up data features,
to encoding hypotheses or predictions, and propagating
only the divergence from these predictions. In support of
Assumption 1, there is also evidence for the idea that
the eﬀects of expectations are hierarchical, in the sensePlease cite this article in press as: Heilbron M, Chait M. Great expectations: Is
(2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroscience.2017.07.061that expected components seem to be progressively ﬁl-
tered out (Rummell et al., 2016; Gill et al., 2008). Atten-
tion, as shown by Jaramillo and Zador (2011), can
inﬂuence processing in A1 in an anticipatory way – how-
ever, it remains unclear whether this form of modulation
is in line with attentional modulation as described by
PC. Finally, the two studies that investigated laminar dif-
ferences in processing of expected versus unexpected
stimuli – a signature characteristic of PC – found (under
ketamine anesthesia) no distinct laminar proﬁles and
(using self-generated sounds) strong expectation sup-
pression in the deep rather than superﬁcial layers of cor-
tex. Although methodological issues prevent strong
conclusions from being drawn, the animal-model literature
contains fascinating results that call for more experimentsthere evidence for predictive coding in auditory cortex?. Neuroscience
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8 August 2017in awake animals, since only studies of this type can ulti-
mately conﬁrm or falsify key assumptions of predictive
coding.
HUMAN IMAGING AND ELECTROPHYSIOLOGY
Predictive coding and MMN
Human auditory studies on predictive coding often use
some variation of the Mismatch Negativity or ‘MMN’
paradigm. MMN is measured using a method in which a
sequence of stimuli (typically a repeated tone)
establishes a regularity that is violated by a ‘deviant’
stimulus (‘oddball paradigm’; Fig. 2C). MMN is the
negative component of a diﬀerence wave, obtained by
subtracting the ‘standard’ from the ‘deviant’ response,
and is found at 100–250 ms.
Traditionally, two main hypotheses on MMN exist.
According to the memory-based hypothesis (Na¨a¨ta¨nen
et al., 1978; Winkler and Czigler, 1998), MMN is gener-
ated by a system comparing auditory inputs with a mem-
ory template. When a diﬀerence is detected, the system
signals an error, and adjusts the template. According to
the adaptation hypothesis (May et al., 1999;
Ja¨a¨skela¨inen et al., 2004; May and Tiitinen, 2010) cells
tuned to repeated ‘standard’ tones simply adapt – due
to passive processes such as synaptic depression – while
neighboring inputs tuned to ‘deviants’ remain unadapted
and elicit stronger responses. By implication, the
oddball-evoked MMN is not a separate evoked potential
but rather a delayed and attenuated N1, that appears sep-
arate only in the diﬀerence wave.
In this dispute, PC takes a middle ground position.
Like all memory-based accounts, PC interprets MMN as
a mismatch signal – a mismatch, however, between the
input and a prospective prediction, rather than a
retrospective template. But like the adaptation
hypothesis, PC considers MMN not as a separate
evoked response, but simply as an ampliﬁed contrast
between an expected (standard) response and a
surprising (novel) response. In the adaptation
hypothesis, however, both the response and its
suppression are stimulus-driven: there is no error signal.
Under PC, every response is an expression of error and
can be larger or smaller depending on predictions. This
last point – the dependence on predictions – is also
what makes PC considerably less parsimonious than
the adaptation hypothesis. Applying Ockham’s razor, we3
Fig. 3. Brain responses to predictable and unpredictable sounds. Top: Progr
cortical regions of a mouse model (Rummell et al., 2016). The progressive we
the existence of an increasingly sparse code, in which eventually only non-p
Repetition suppression and expectation dissociated in time (Todorovic and d
MEG responses (40–60 ms). Expectation (but not repetition) attenuated the r
expectation aﬀected the late response (200–500 ms). Gray horizontal bars u
between conditions. Bottom: In contrast to the oft reported attenuation of bra
opposite eﬀect: Brain responses to rapid tone sequences that transitioned from
in the MEG response. This ﬁnding demonstrates that the brain appears to e
MMN). As discussed in Barascud et al. (2016) the DC shift appears to vary c
pattern.
Please cite this article in press as: Heilbron M, Chait M. Great expectations: Is
(2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroscience.2017.07.061can only consider evidence in favor of PC if it cannot be
explained by a simpler process – which, in audition, is
often simple adaptation. Beyond the simple oddball
paradigm, the MMN literature has shown that listeners
are sensitive to the violation of potentially very complex
patterns (see Paavilainen et al., 2007 for review), which
is usually interpreted as evidence for the exquisite sensi-
tivity of auditory cortex to patterns in sound. Unfortu-
nately, most studies with an explicit focus on predictive
coding in the auditory modality (see reviewed below) have
used the simple oddball paradigm or its variations in
which predictability, or regularity, is manipulated by repe-
tition, which makes adaptation all the more diﬃcult to
exclude.Repetition suppression – Adaptation or expectation?
The neuroimaging analog of the physiological
phenomenon of adaptation is repetition suppression
(RS). As reviewed by Grill-Spector et al. (2006), multiple
mechanisms for RS have been proposed. We can distin-
guish between mechanisms that explain RS via passive
adaptation eﬀects, sometimes called ‘neural fatigue’,
and accounts that interpret it as a signature of increased
processing eﬃciency. PC belongs to the second type: it
ascribes the suppression not only to the repetition itself,
but also to the expectations it induces. Interesting support
for this account comes from Costa-Faidella et al. (2011)
who recorded EEG responses in a roving standard para-
digm (Fig. 2E). This is a variation of the oddball paradigm
that replaces the deviant stimulus with a variable stan-
dard. After a number of repetitions, the standard changes,
creating a ‘deviant’ that becomes a ‘standard’ – while
remaining physically identical. The authors used two con-
ditions, with predictable and unpredictable timing. In the
predictable condition, Inter Stimulus Intervals (ISI) were
ﬁxed. In the unpredictable condition, ISIs varied ran-
domly. The suppressive eﬀect of repetition (reduction of
the response to the standard tone) was reduced in the
condition with unpredictable timing. Because the average
ISI and number of stimulations were identical between
conditions, this suggests that repetition suppression is
(at least in part) modulated by predictability.
Also in a roving paradigm, Lieder et al. (2013) used
computational modeling to compare prediction and adap-
tation. For each stimulus presentation they calculated the
‘MMN amplitude’, by subtracting the ﬁnal (‘standard’) pre-essive attenuation of responses to self-generated sounds at diﬀerent
akening often resulted in near-silencing in hippocampus, and suggests
redicted components are propagated for further processing. Middle:
e Lange, 2012): Repetition (but not expectation) attenuated the early
esponse at an intermediate latency (100–200 ms). Both repetition and
nder the ﬁgure indicate the time intervals with a signiﬁcant diﬀerence
in responses to predictable sounds, Barascud et al. (2016) found the
a random to repeating pattern are manifest as a substantial increase
ncode the state (RAND vs REG) rather than the transition (as in e.g.
onsistently with the predictability (negentropy) of the ongoing stimulus
there evidence for predictive coding in auditory cortex?. Neuroscience
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8 August 2017sentation from the earlier (‘deviant’) presentations. The
authors then compared diﬀerent models to explain trial-
by-trial ﬂuctuations in this MMN amplitude. The ﬁrst model
was an adaptation model. This model was ‘phenomenolo
gical’ in the sense that it made no assumptions on the
mechanism behind adaptation, but simply embodied ﬂuc-
tuating responsiveness of populations tuned to diﬀerent
frequencies. This ‘phenomenological’ approach was con-
trasted to a computational approach in which MMN ampli-
tudes were compared to several parameters in a hidden
Markov model which tracked transition probabilities.
Overall, parameters of the computational model explained
the ﬂuctuations better than adaptation. Interestingly, most
variance was explained not by prediction error, but by
model-adjustment. Together, the authors write, this sug-
gests that attenuation observed in a roving paradigm is
best explained as a form of learning, rather than as
adaptation.
More modeling results are found in Wacongne et al.
(2012) who present a PC model of A1. Contrary to Lieder
et al. (2011) and the DCM studies (see Section Eﬀective
connectivity – clues from DCM) Wacongne et al. (2012)
speciﬁed their model at the level of individual spiking neu-
rons, thus committing to a much more detailed implemen-
tation of PC. The model comprised two cortical columns,
each selectively responsive to a diﬀerent tone (A or B).
Crucially (and unlike standard PC) error units are located
in the thalamorecipient granular layer. In that same error
layer, GABA-ergic neurons receive excitatory input from
predictive units in layer II/III, eﬀectively subtracting the
prediction from the incoming input, resulting in an error
term. This error term is sent to the predictive layers,
where it forms a memory trace used to adapt the internal
model via spike-timing dependent plasticity at NMDA-
weights. Using the sum of postsynaptic currents in each
layer as a proxy for the ERP, Wacongne et al. (2012)
show that this set-up – intentionally lacking synaptic habit-
uation mechanisms – can account for an array of phe-
nomena from the MMN literature, such as the
parametric modulation of MMN amplitude by stimulus
probability (e.g. Sams et al., 1983); MMN to unexpected
repetition (Fig. 2F; e.g. Saarinen et al., 1992; Horva´th
and Winkler, 2004); MMN to omission (Fig. 2D; e.g.
Yabe et al., 1997; Raij et al., 1997); and blindness to con-
text (Wacongne et al., 2011, see below).
To further dissociate adaptation and PC based
accounts, Wacongne et al. (2012) performed a MEG
experiment on the ‘repetition MMN’. Participants listened
to tone-pairs that were overwhelmingly alternations
(AB), and only rarely repetitions (AA; Fig. 2F). PC predicts
that an unexpected repetition (AA) should evoke a stron-
ger response – an inversion of the standard MMN. The
adaptation-based explanation (May and Tiitinen, 2010)
suggests this reﬂects adaptation at higher order neurons,
tuned to the AB tone-pair. To exclude this possibility,
Wacongne et al. (2012) inserted an interval of 10 s
between each pair – much longer than the recovery time
of synaptic depression. In every individual participant, AA
indeed elicited an MMN, while no diﬀerence between BA
and BB was observed. Although this result seems highlyPlease cite this article in press as: Heilbron M, Chait M. Great expectations: Is
(2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroscience.2017.07.061suggestive, a replication with a larger number of
participants is needed, since Wacongne and colleagues
tested only 5.
Using a similar paradigm, Todorovic et al. (2011) mea-
sured RS for expected and unexpected repetitions.
Expectancy was manipulated in blocks where either
75% of stimuli were tone-pairs and, 25% single tones
(repetition expected) or vice versa (repetition unex-
pected). Clear RS was observed in the 100–500 ms
range, that was strongly reduced in the unexpected con-
dition, suggesting that RS itself might comprise an expec-
tancy eﬀect. However, since the blockwise manipulation
aﬀected the overall occurrence of the tones – and the
authors used an inter-trial interval of 4–6 s – the eﬀect
could, theoretically at least, be explained by passive
adaptation.612Expectation and surprise along the auditory
hierarchy
In a follow-up study, Todorovic and de Lange (2012)
addressed this issue by adding an extra hierarchical level
of expectations, that allowed them to manipulate repeti-
tion and expectation orthogonally (Fig. 2G). Each trial
consisted of either an identical or non-identical tone-
pair, or a single tone. Orthogonally to this, the frequency
of the ﬁrst tone predicted that of the second tone with a
high validity. Using MEG, the authors observed a dissoci-
ation: repetition (but not expectation) attenuated the early
response (40–60 ms) and expectation (but not repetition)
attenuated the intermediate response (100–200 ms). By
contrast, both repetition and expectation aﬀected the late
response (200–500 ms; Fig. 3). This suggests that RS
might be non-unitary, consisting of a late stage, which
reﬂects the eﬀects of expectation, and an early stage,
which does not (cf. Grotheer and Kova´cs, 2015). How-
ever, the results may also be compatible with PC, if one
casts repetition as a special, low-level form of expectation
(cf. Auksztulewicz and Friston, 2015b).
Similar ﬁndings were reported by Wacongne et al.
(2011), who recorded MEG and EEG responses to viola-
tions of local and global regularities (Fig. 2H). Participants
passively listened to stimuli consisting of ﬁve tones, of
which the ﬁrst four were always identical and the last
one varied. Within each block, a particular variation (e.g.
‘xxxxY’) was dominant, occurring 75% of trials. In the
remaining 25% of trials, the last tone was replaced by
either a deviation (e.g. ‘xxxxX’ within ‘xxxxY’ blocks) or
an omission (‘xxxx_’. The authors found that local devi-
ants (i.e. ‘xxxxY’ even when it was the common stimulus)
were always accompanied by a measurable MMN (at 80–
150 ms), but that in xxxxX blocks (where the local deviant
‘xxxxY’ was also globally unexpected) this deﬂection was
larger. By contrast, global deviant responses were found
at later latencies (150–600 ms), although no interaction
was reported for this dissociation. Note that, for xxxxY
blocks, a global deviant amounts to an unexpected repe-
tition eliciting a stronger response than an expected alter-
nation – an inversion of the MMN.
Recently, Du¨rschmid et al. (2016) provided more evi-
dence for a hierarchical organization of mismatch signals,there evidence for predictive coding in auditory cortex?. Neuroscience
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8 August 2017dissociating not time-scales but brain regions, using high-
gamma (>60 Hz) activity as an index of local spiking.
Du¨rschmid et al. (2016) were able to measure high-
gamma components using ECoG recordings from
patients with frontal and temporal electrodes, who lis-
tened to predictable and unpredictable deviants embed-
ded in an uninterrupted train of tones. In the predictable
condition, the deviant tone (550 Hz) always occurred after
four consecutive standard tones (500 Hz), rendering the
deviant ‘globally’ predictable. In the unpredictable condi-
tion, the deviant tone occurred randomly after at least
three presentations of the standard tone, rendering the
deviant fully unpredictable. The authors found no main
eﬀect of block type, but they did ﬁnd an interaction: high
gamma was found for unpredictable, but not predictable
deviants at frontal electrodes, while at temporal elec-
trodes both deviant-types elicited high-gamma
responses. The authors interpreted this as demonstrating
that frontal cortex monitors ‘the bigger picture’. This inter-
pretation is compatible with the source reconstruction
results by Wacongne et al. (2011), who also found that
global (but not local) deviants activated a broad fronto-
parietal network. However, this claim could have been
stronger had Du¨rschmid et al. (2016) manipulated local
and global regularities independently, instead of compar-
ing repeating versus random patterns.
Strauss et al. (2015) did present such an independent
manipulation. In the same MEG-EEG paradigm as used
by Wacongne et al. (2011), the authors showed that
late-latency responses to global deviants disappeared
categorically in all stages of sleep, concluding that predic-
tive coding was ‘disrupted’. This is remarkable, because
the MMN persists during sleep (Sculthorpe et al., 2009)
and even coma (Fischer et al., 2000; but see Dykstra
and Gutschalk, 2015). However, Strauss et al. (2015)
demonstrate that the persisting ‘sleep MMN’ is strongly
reduced and lacks sustained fronto-parietal activity. Over
and above these diﬀerences in degree, sleep-MMN also
seemed to be qualitatively diﬀerent. Strauss et al.
(2015) showed this by training a classiﬁer to distinguish
local standards and deviants. When trained and tested
on responses recorded during wakefulness, the algorithm
reliably distinguished signals from early (76 ms) to late
(620 ms) latencies. However, when the classiﬁer – trained
on wakefulness data – was tested on sleep data, it only
generalized to early (76–100 ms) and late (212–588 ms)
signals. For signals from the MMN latency (100–
200 ms) it did not generalize at all, and failed to perform
better than chance. The authors interpret this result as
new evidence for the idea that MMN might be a conse-
quence of several independent processes: an automatic
process arising from passive adaptation (May and
Tiitinen, 2010) and therefore persistent under sleep, as
well as an independent process arising from predictive
coding.
Interestingly, the eﬀects of sleep were corroborated in
the realm of anesthesia. Uhrig et al. (2014) had earlier
reported the ﬁrst neural signature hierarchical novelty
responses (potentially an index of PC) in non-human ani-
mals, using primate fMRI in macaque. They found that
only globally deviant sequences recruited a largePlease cite this article in press as: Heilbron M, Chait M. Great expectations: Is
(2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroscience.2017.07.061fronto-parietal network known in humans as the neuronal
workspace (Dehaene et al., 1998). Recently, Uhrig et al.
(2016) repeated the experiment under varying degrees
of anesthesia. Both anesthetics (propofol and ketamine)
weakened local and distorted global mismatch responses.
Ketamine was especially powerful, eﬀectively abolishing
the global mismatch eﬀect. Since both plasticity
(Collingridge and Bliss, 1987) and intra-regional feedback
(Self et al., 2012) are thought to be NMDA-dependent,
and ketamine impairs MMN even at light dosages
(Umbricht et al., 2002), this is perhaps unsurprising. How-
ever, ketamine is a popular anesthetic, used by three of
the ﬁve animal studies here reviewed (Szymanski et al.,
2009; Jaramillo and Zador, 2011; Rubin et al., 2016).
Since it abolishes global mismatch responses, and the
persisting responses may be qualitatively diﬀerent
(Strauss et al., 2015), these ﬁndings underline that future
studies of PC should avoid the use of ketamine – and, ide-
ally, of anesthesia altogether.
Finally, Lecaignard et al. (2015) manipulated (global)
predictability of auditory deviants, but found no hierarchi-
cal eﬀects. Deviant predictability aﬀected ERP amplitudes
at early (<70 ms), MMN (100–250 ms) and late
(>300 ms) latencies. Puzzlingly, however, the biggest
eﬀect of global predictability was found at the earliest
time-window (<70 ms), where the MMN was completely
abolished only in the globally predictable condition; an
eﬀect which stands in contrast to other studies on hierar-
chical PC and hierarchical deviance detection more gen-
erally (Grimm and Escera, 2012; Cornella et al., 2012;
Escera and Malmierca, 2014).
Altogether, hierarchy is central to PC and converging
evidence now demonstrates that eﬀects of prediction
depend on hierarchical processing level. Nevertheless,
some ambiguities remain. A ﬁrst issue is whether
hierarchically ‘high’ and ‘low’ eﬀects reﬂect a single
mechanism. Some human electrophysiology studies
claim they do not (Todorovic and de Lange, 2012;
Strauss et al., 2015; Lo´pez-Caballero et al., 2016). These
studies associate eﬀects on early processing with passive
adaptation (e.g. the early, sleep-persistent MMN in
Strauss et al., 2015) and eﬀects on later, ‘higher’ process-
ing with prediction (see also Grotheer and Kova´cs, 2015).
However, this hard dichotomy seems at odds with results
from animal electrophysiology which report prediction
eﬀects already at A1 (Rubin et al., 2016; Rummell et al.,
2016; Gill et al., 2008; Ulanovsky et al., 2004). What adds
to the ambiguity is that most studies used repetitions or
Bernoulli sequences to manipulate prediction, causing
expectation and adaptation to be confounded. A second,
more subtle ambiguity is whether the discussed interac-
tions between hierarchy and prediction constitute evi-
dence for hierarchical prediction, in the sense of
hierarchical Bayesian inference. Theoretically, interac-
tions as those in the animal literature – showing that pre-
diction eﬀects become stronger at higher hierarchical
levels (Rummell et al., 2016; Gill et al., 2008) – do not
necessarily support the notion of hierarchically nested
predictions, which would require a task which manipulates
multiple, nested (or hierarchically dependent) regularities
– as only few studies have done so far. Accordingly, whilethere evidence for predictive coding in auditory cortex?. Neuroscience
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8 August 2017there is clear evidence for the eﬀect of expectations on
responses (Assumption 2) and suggestive clues for hier-
archical organization of expectations (Assumption 1) pro-
gress will now depend on studies using stimuli with
multiple nested regularities, and which manipulate expec-
tation in a way not confounded by adaptation.
Hearing silences: Omission as a window into
prediction
When omitting a highly expected sound such as a tone in
a beat, listeners can ‘hear’ the absence. In such
circumstances, neural responses time-locked to the
omitted sound have been observed (Yabe et al., 1997;
Raij et al., 1997; Fig. 2D). These ‘omission responses’
oﬀer an appealing vantage point to study top-down pre-
diction decoupled from bottom-up input, and have
become a popular method for studies on predictive
coding.
Theoretically, detecting silences could happen either
retrospectively (by comparing perceptual input and
memory template after the input is processed) or
prospectively (by directly matching predictions to input,
as proposed by PC). Bendixen et al. (2009) attempted
to dissociate these possibilities. Participants listened to
isofrequent tone-pairs of which either the ﬁrst or the sec-
ond tone was occasionally omitted. If the second tone
was omitted, it could nonetheless be predicted by the ﬁrst
tone (‘predictable’ condition). But if the ﬁrst tone was omit-
ted, its identity could only be ‘restored’ after hearing the
second tone (restorable condition). The authors com-
pared evoked responses to a control condition in which
the tones were neither predictable nor restorable. When
comparing the amplitudes of the early component (up to
50 ms post tone/omission onset) the authors found omis-
sion responses in the predictable condition which were
essentially identical to responses evoked by actually pre-
sented tones, but not in the restorable condition. This was
interpreted as pre-activation of the sensory representa-
tions of the predicted tones. The authors concluded that
auditory expectation works prospectively and not retro-
spectively. However, since they looked for main eﬀects
at very short latencies (<50 ms post onset, identical to
the duration of the tone), and focused exclusively on
evoked (as opposed to not time locked) responses the
analysis may have been biased to ﬁnding prospective
pre-activations, and not retrospective memory eﬀects.
Hughes et al. (2001) took a similar approach to test
whether change-detection involves prediction. Patients,
undergoing intracranial recordings from temporal cortex,
performed an oddball paradigm with tones or tone-pairs
as standards and silences as oddballs. Strikingly, in all
patients, channels ﬁring to tones also ﬁred to omissions,
often more strongly. Furthermore, 5 of 10 patients exhib-
ited ‘omission selective’ channels that only responded to
unexpected omissions, and to other unexpected stimuli
like bird-chirps. Finally, and contrary to other demonstra-
tions of omission responses (Raij et al., 1997; Chennu
et al., 2016) the eﬀects seemed wholly independent of
attention. The omission-selective channels may have
been the ﬁrst recordings of error-units. Unfortunately,
Hughes et al. (2001) did not reconstruct the exact locationPlease cite this article in press as: Heilbron M, Chait M. Great expectations: Is
(2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroscience.2017.07.061or depth of their electrodes, other than being associative
(non-primary) auditory cortex, which makes the striking
ﬁndings somewhat anecdotal.
A diﬀerent approach is described in SanMiguel et al.
(2013a,b), who used self-generated sounds to elicit omis-
sion responses (Fig. 2A). Participants were asked to
press a button every 600–1200 ms, after which a sound
was generated in 88%, 50% or 0% of trials. To control
for motor activity, the response after button presses that
were never followed by a sound (the 0% block) was sub-
tracted from the omission AEP evoked by the unexpected
‘silence’. After subtraction, signiﬁcant omission responses
were present in the 88% block, but not in the 50% (ran-
dom) block. In a follow-up experiment, SanMiguel et al.
(2013b) showed that omission responses to self-
generated sounds were only elicited if a button press
was predictive of both the identity and timing of the eli-
cited sound, rather than just the timing, which suggests
that timing alone is not enough to form an accurate pre-
diction of a stimulus.
Chennu et al. (2016) compared omission responses
recorded with EEG and MEG. Using a local–global para-
digm (Fig. 2H), the ﬁfth tone was a global standard in 74%
of trials, and a global deviant or omission in 13% of trials.
To conﬁrm that omission responses reﬂected expectation
eﬀects and not passive carry-over eﬀects such as oscilla-
tory entrainment (May and Tiitinen, 2010), unexpected
omissions of a ﬁfth tone (occurring 14% of trials) were
compared to ‘expected omissions’ from sequences in
which the ﬁfth tone was always omitted. In the EEG
recordings, this revealed clear omission responses that
were modulated by attention. Surprisingly, in the MEG
data the omission response was absent. This divergence
between MEG and EEG is interesting but diﬃcult to inter-
pret, and most likely arises from the orientation of the neu-
ral sources or measurement noise. However, it might also
be consistent with a speciﬁc interpretation of omission
responses as reﬂecting prediction units only, which may
reside in deeper layers and should therefore be more dif-
ﬁcult to detect with MEG.
Fujioka et al. (2009), who also used MEG, induced
(and violated) expectations by using a regular musical
beat, from which tones were occasionally omitted. Each
tone elicited a short gamma (>40 Hz) burst, as is typical
for external stimuli. However, the authors also observed a
slow, oscillatory modulation of the beta band that was
phase locked with the occurrence of the tone. This slow
power-modulation steadily decreased after each beat,
reaching its peak just before the occurrence of a new
tone, thus indicative of a potential internal oscillatory or
rhythmic anticipation signal (see also Fujioka et al.,
2012). Intriguingly, when a tone was unexpectedly omit-
ted from the beat, the decrease in beta power was not
observed, but a (stimulus-like) sudden peak in gamma
was observed. This observation not only supports sen-
sory prediction during beat perception, but also, indirectly,
the notion that beta (‘prediction’) and gamma (‘error’)
bands signal diﬀerent computational variables (see Sec-
tion The rhythms of prediction).
Finally, a number of earlier discussed studies also
reported omission responses of a varying extent.there evidence for predictive coding in auditory cortex?. Neuroscience
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8 August 2017Todorovic et al. (2011) and Todorovic and de Lange
(2012) reported higher ﬁeld strengths after unexpected
than expected silences. However, their eﬀects were
rather small and in Todorovic and de Lange (2012) limited
to late latencies (200–500 ms). More akin to ‘real’ evoked
responses are the omission responses in Wacongne et al.
(2011), who also compared expected with unexpected
omissions and found (contra May and Tiitinen, 2010) sig-
niﬁcant responses only for unexpected omissions, in both
MEG and EEG.
Altogether, evidence from EEG (Bendixen et al., 2009;
SanMiguel et al., 2013a,b; Chennu et al., 2016), MEG
(Wacongne et al., 2011; Todorovic et al., 2011;
Todorovic and de Lange, 2012; Andreou et al., 2015;
Chennu et al., 2016) and ECoG (Hughes et al., 2001)
shows that omissions can evoke responses that are
time-locked to the omitted stimulus and appear to be gen-
erated in auditory cortex and superior temporal gyrus.
Crucially, omission responses seem to occur only after
unexpected omissions (Wacongne et al., 2011; Chennu
et al., 2016) – challenging the suggestion that they could
reﬂect passive carry-over eﬀects – and if the omitted
sounds are prospectively predictable (Bendixen et al.,
2009) – suggesting a predictive mechanism (cf. Assump-
tion 1). However, the literature also shows some remark-
able variability. For instance, using MEG, Todorovic et al.
(2011) and Todorovic and de Lange (2012) ﬁnd small and
late deﬂections, unlike ‘real’ auditory-evoked ﬁelds, and
Chennu et al. (2016) ﬁnd no omission responses at all.
Using EEG, Chennu et al. (2016) and Bendixen et al.
(2009) ﬁnd clearer omission responses. However, they
are still quite diﬀerent from ‘real’ AEPs, or from the spec-
tacular responses in SanMiguel et al. (2013a,b) or the
ECoG omission responses in Hughes et al. (2001). More-
over, while the MEG/EEG omission responses in Raij
et al. (1997) and Chennu et al. (2016) are strongly
aﬀected by attention, attention had no eﬀect on the ECoG
omission responses in Hughes et al. (2001).
Beyond the empirical variability, there is some
theoretical variability in how omission responses should
be interpreted. For some authors (e.g. SanMiguel et al.,
2013a,b; Schro¨ger et al., 2015) they are simply expres-
sions of prediction error. This would render omission
responses as perhaps the signature ﬁnding of PC, by
showing that evoked responses fundamentally reﬂect sur-
prise – even in the absence of sensory input. However, as
Wacongne et al. (2012) point out, this interpretation criti-
cally depends on how prediction error is calculated. If
one uses subtraction, performed by a focussed inhibitory
pulse that ‘subtracts’ predictions from sensory input, it is
diﬃcult to see how omissions could elicit prediction error
without allowing negative ﬁring rates. In that case, omis-
sion responses are perhaps better interpreted as reﬂect-
ing purely prediction (or pre-activation) signals, which
speaks to its relative weakness and variability. Due to
these ambiguities, it is diﬃcult to directly interpret the
implications of omission responses to (speciﬁc formula-
tions of) predictive coding. Nevertheless, collectively,
these studies present highly suggestive, converging evi-
dence of anticipatory mechanisms, operating without con-
scious expectation, in auditory cortex.977
Please cite this article in press as: Heilbron M, Chait M. Great expectations: Is
(2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroscience.2017.07.061Predictability and precision
Results with the MMN paradigm demonstrate that
listeners are sensitive to the violation of a variety of
sound patterns, including very complex regularities. This
has been interpreted as (indirect) evidence for the
brain’s remarkable sensitivity to acoustic patterning.
However, a crucial missing link is an understanding of
the process by which the brain acquires an internal
model of regularities in the environment.
Recently, Barascud et al. (2016); see below for repli-
cation by Southwell et al. (2017) presented direct evi-
dence of the discovery and representation of acoustic
patterns, using rapid, statistically structured sequences
of tone-pips that transitioned from random to regular,
and vice versa (Fig. 2I). Methodologically, this paradigm
constitutes a departure from previous paradigms in two
ways: ﬁrstly, the use of very rapid sequences precludes
conscious discovery of regularity, instead mostly tapping
bottom-up-driven processes. Secondly, regularity was
manipulated independently from repetition, thus decou-
pling the eﬀects of predictability from low-level adaptation.
Behaviorally, Barascud et al. (2016) ﬁrst observed that
listeners were extremely quick at detecting the emer-
gence of regular patterns, performing on par with an ideal
observer model. Brain responses measured from naı¨ve
listeners were equally rapid. Remarkably, the onset of
regularity manifested as a large-scale increase in sus-
tained amplitude (Fig. 3). Oﬀsets of regularity (transitions
toward randomness), by contrast, were associated with a
large drop in sustained power. Source reconstruction
identiﬁed a network of sources in auditory cortex (AC),
inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) and the hippocampus. AC
and IFG sources are commonly reported in the context
of the MMN and interpreted as supporting the re-entrant
error-minimizing process underlying it (Molholm et al.,
2005; Opitz et al., 2002; Garrido et al., 2009b; see Sec-
tion Dynamic Causal Modeling of MMN).
The ﬁnding that emergence (and disappearance) of
regularity in unfolding sound sequences is associated
with large-scale sustained responses is interesting for
various reasons: ﬁrstly, it suggests the brain encodes
the state (‘regular’ vs ‘random’) rather than just the
transition (as in e.g. MMN). Secondly, the amplitude
pattern [(regular) > (random)] is not easily interpretable
in terms of simple physical attributes of the signal –
adaptation, for example, would result in the opposite
pattern. Finally, the neural signature of complex
regularity detection (i.e. enhanced responses) is
opposite to that of simpler regularity detection (i.e.
attenuated responses) observed in many previous
experiments, for example using the roving standard
paradigm.
Interestingly, the eﬀect is also opposite to all PC
eﬀects we have been considering so far, in which
predictability is associated with weaker responses.
Barascud et al. (2016) suggested precision-weighting
could underlie this inversion: if regularity is an index of
reliability or precision, PC predicts that regular signals
are up-weighted and prioritized for further processing
(see Section Attention as precision). As many biological
stimuli unfold as regularities over time, it also seems bio-there evidence for predictive coding in auditory cortex?. Neuroscience
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8 August 2017logically useful to prioritize such signals, for instance for
subsequent auditory object formation or scene analysis.
Evidence in line with this interpretation was
subsequently presented by Sohoglu and Chait (2016b)
who used artiﬁcial ‘scenes’ consisting of concurrent
tone-pip streams (modeling acoustic sources) which were
temporally regular or random. Participants were quicker
and more accurate to detect an object appearing in a tem-
porally regular scene, and enjoyed an additional slight
beneﬁt if the object itself was regular. MEG responses
in both passive listeners and listeners actively engaged
in detecting the occasional appearance of a new source
within the scene revealed increased sustained activity in
scenes comprised of regular sources. Over and above
this ‘scene eﬀect’, new source appearance in regular sce-
nes was also associated with increased responses rela-
tive to random scenes – an eﬀect interpreted as
evidence for a mechanism that infers the precision of sen-
sory input and uses this information to up-regulate neural
processing toward more reliable sensory signals.
More clues on the amplifying eﬀect of regularity are
found in Hsu et al. (2015). Subjects listened to sequences
of tones with ascending frequencies in which the ﬁnal tone
varied. In 75% of trials, the tone complied with the local
regularity (predicted condition). In 12.5% of trials, the last
tone was unexpectedly lower than the ﬁrst tone, violating
the expectation induced by the ascending sequence
(‘mispredicted’ condition). Finally, in 12.5% of trials, the
sequence was jumbled altogether. The authors found that
while predicted tones elicited a weaker N1 deﬂection than
mispredicted ones (a well-documented expectation
eﬀect), wholly unpredicted tones elicited an even weaker
N1 still. According to Hsu et al. (2015), this is because
predicted and mispredicted responses express both a
prediction and a (small or large) prediction error, but
unpredicted responses reﬂect only prediction error and
are therefore weakest. However, as remarked by Ross
and Hansen (2016), it seems at odds with the probabilistic
nature of PC to assume predictions are absent in the
unpredicted condition: rather, what distinguishes the
unpredicted condition is the low predictability of the signal.
The attenuated N1 to wholly unpredictable stimuli might
be understood as inversion of the enhanced response to
predictable stimuli in Barascud et al. (2016) and
Sohoglu and Chait (2016b): the brain might consider the
jumbled tone ladder as noisy and uninformative, hence
down-weighting the response.
In sum, accumulating evidence suggests that, at least
under certain conditions, predictability may enhance,
rather than suppress, neural responses. This result ﬁts
into the PC framework if one considers eﬀects of
precision: sequences of random stimuli may be ‘ﬂagged’
as uninteresting noise (low precision) and hence down-
weighted, while streams containing a regularity are
considered informative and are hence up-weighted.
Since precision can explain eﬀects that are opposite to
‘traditional’ PC eﬀects, invoking it begs the question
when, exactly, predictability is supposed to suppress
neural responses and when it should enhance them. As
we will see, this need for a ‘principled account’ will be aPlease cite this article in press as: Heilbron M, Chait M. Great expectations: Is
(2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroscience.2017.07.061recurring theme in studies that examine the main
manifestation of precision-weighting — i.e. attention.Attention as precision
Because the world is variable and the brain noisy, a
degree of prediction error is inevitable. Distinguishing
such ‘residue error’ (related to noise) from relevant error
(related to incorrect beliefs or changes in the world)
requires that not all prediction error is treated equally. A
Bayes-optimal approach, successfully applied in
engineering (Kalman, 1960) as well as neuroscience
(Yu, 2014) is to weight errors by their reliability, typically
quantiﬁed as the uncertainty of predictions relative to
the that of observations, a coeﬃcient known as Kalman
gain (Kalman, 1960; Anderson and Moore, 1979). When
the gain (precision) is high, inputs are up-weighted and
will dominate inference; when it is low, inputs are down-
weighted and predictions dominate inference. Several
authors in the predictive coding ﬁeld (Rao, 2005;
Spratling, 2008a,b, 2010; Feldman and Friston, 2010;
see also Dayan and Zemel, 1999; Yu and Dayan, 2003;
Yu and Dayan, 2005a,b) have used such optimal handling
of uncertainty as a framework for attention, since it oﬀers
normative principles that can explain selective processing
by motivating why some signals are computationally more
relevant than others.
Uncertainty-weighting aﬀects inference and learning
diﬀerently; here, we will focus on perceptual inference
(but see Yu, 2014, for a treatment of Bayesian
approaches to attention which also covers learning).
During inference, reliable inputs are weighted more
strongly, and PC proposes that attending to a feature
amounts to expecting that signals with this feature will
be reliable or informative, and should thus be prioritized
for processing (Feldman and Friston, 2010). Response
strength should therefore always be a function of both
the size of the error and its precision. In other words,
every brain response should be sensitive to attentional
modulation. This proposal implies a departure from
accounts of MMN that describe MMN as pre-attentive
(Garrido et al., 2009b; Ja¨a¨skela¨inen et al., 2004;
Winkler and Czigler, 1998).
Preliminary support is found in Chennu et al. (2013).
The authors recorded EEG while presenting blocks of
tone sequences to one ear, occasionally replacing the ﬁfth
tone by either a diﬀerent tone in the same ear (monaural
deviant) or by the same tone in the opposite ear (interau-
ral deviant). Additionally, participants counted deviant
tones (attend tones) or deviant sequences (attend
sequences) or performed a visual task (distraction).
Focussing here on local deviants at MMN latencies, both
monaural and interaural MMN were reduced during dis-
traction compared to attending sequences. Attending
tones, however, instead of amplifying the MMN (by
increasing gain of error-neurons), attenuated it. The
authors suggest their manipulation may have been con-
founded: counting deviant tones did not only focus atten-
tion on tones (just as counting sequences did) but mightthere evidence for predictive coding in auditory cortex?. Neuroscience
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8 August 2017have also increased conscious expectation of unexpected
tones, thus decreasing overall surprise.
To circumvent this confound, other studies
manipulated attention and prediction orthogonally.
Auksztulewicz and Friston (2015a) used a roving stan-
dard paradigm in which participants attended to one of
two time time-windows (early or late), after which the rov-
ing standard was presented at each window with an inde-
pendent probability of 50%. Participants reported if there
was no stimulus at the attended latency. Only trials where
the tone was presented at both latencies were included,
thus rejecting all possible motor artifacts. A signiﬁcant
interaction eﬀect was found; speciﬁcally, MMN was
observed in attended, but not in unattended time-
windows. This attentional enhancement of MMN is com-
patible with precision weighting. Note, however, that the
non-signiﬁcance of MMN outside the scope of attention
seems to contradict earlier ﬁndings that MMN is not
dependent on attention; note, too, that the eﬀects
reported by Auksztulewicz and Friston (2015a) are rela-
tively late and relatively short – for instance, the MMN
only reached signiﬁcance between, 190 and 210 ms and
the deviance-attention interaction only between 193 and
197 ms. Both may have been related to a lack of power
after rejecting so many trials.
Another independent manipulation was reported by
Hsu et al. (2014). The authors presented two streams of
tone pairs: in one stream, the frequency of the second
tone in a pair was always two natural keys higher than
the ﬁrst; in the other stream, the relationship between
the ﬁrst and second tone was random. Attention was
manipulated by asking participants to report occasional
tones with decreased loudness in one of the streams.
The authors found an interaction of attention and predic-
tion on N1 amplitudes. Speciﬁcally, attended/predictable
tones elicited a stronger response than all other tones,
between which diﬀerences were non-signiﬁcant. This
includes attended versus unattended unpredictable
tones, hence the authors concluded that attentional
enhancement of N1 depends on prediction. Note, how-
ever, that this interacting eﬀect between attention and
prediction (attention reversing the eﬀect of prediction) is
at odds with Auksztulewicz and Friston (2015a), who
found the opposite (attention enhancing prediction
eﬀects) 100 ms later.
A recent EEG study by Garrido et al. (2017) compared
the two accounts explicitly. Participants were presented
Gaussian white noise to both ears and instructed to detect
silent gaps in one or both ears. Embedded in the noise,
task-irrelevant oddball sequences were presented. The
authors formulated two models of the interplay between
attention and prediction: in the ﬁrst, attention could
reverse the eﬀect of prediction (Hsu et al., 2014; see also
Kok et al., 2012 in vision). In the second model, attention
enhanced responses, predicted and unpredicted alike.
The authors observed an MMN, and found that attention
enhanced it, but contrary to Hsu et al. (2014) they found
no interaction. In line with this observation, Bayesian
model comparison favored the opposition model. Con-
trary to Auksztulewicz and Friston (2015a), but in line withPlease cite this article in press as: Heilbron M, Chait M. Great expectations: Is
(2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroscience.2017.07.061the MMN literature, MMN was also found in the absence
of attention.
Rather than deliberately directed, attention is
sometimes automatically attracted to a stimulus. Stimuli
with this capacity are called salient (Itti et al., 1998). Pre-
dictive coding accounts for salience by appealing to the
intrinsic precision of stimuli. Intense stimuli, for instance,
can be seen as having a high signal-to-noise ratio due
to sheer signal strength; inversely, regular stimuli would
enjoy high precision by virtue of low variance. Indeed, this
latter eﬀect was proposed by Barascud et al. (2016) to
explain large increases in MEG signals induced by audi-
tory regularities (Fig. 3). Such up-weighting of regular
sounds seems ethologically sensible, as regular patterns
often carry stable, behaviorally relevant information about
the world. The account also has a straightforward empir-
ical consequence – regular stimuli should attract atten-
tion. In vision, a recent study indeed demonstrates this
eﬀect (Zhao et al., 2013).
Southwell et al. (2017) tested this idea in the auditory
domain. Using EEG, the authors ﬁrst replicated the MEG-
eﬀects observed by Barascud et al. (2016): task-irrelevant
regular sequences (as used by Barascud and colleagues)
induced large increases in sustained EEG amplitude.
Next, the authors tested behaviorally whether the same
regular patterns would capture attention more strongly,
measured as the interference with concurrent tasks.
Remarkably, their results suggested that regularity was
not more distracting (if task-irrelevant) or more salient (if
task-relevant) than random patterns. The fact that neu-
rally, regularity induces marked sustained amplitude
increases, but behaviorally the same patterns are not
more salient, contradicts the attentional gain explanation
proposed by Barascud et al. (2016). Southwell et al.
(2017) suggest that this leaves us with three alternative
hypotheses: Either the gain in amplitude reﬂects an
upsurge of (poly-synaptic) inhibition or explaining away
by higher regions, which is not dissociable from excitation
using M/EEG. Alternatively, it may reﬂect a number of
quite distinct processes. Or ﬁnally, it could reﬂect some
form of precision-weighting which does not manifest as
high-level attentional capture. This last possibility, how-
ever, would imply that under PC attention is (by deﬁnition)
adaptive precision-weighting, but adaptive precision-
weighting is not (always) attention. While logically possi-
ble, this creates an awkward disconnect between neural
responses and cognition, and calls for a more principled
approach to decide when precision weighting is ‘high-
level attentional’ or not.
Altogether, the depiction of attention as the weighting
of sensory signals by their (expected) precision (Feldman
and Friston, 2010; see also Rao, 2005; Spratling, 2008a,
b) elegantly integrates many known attentional eﬀects
into the realm of prediction. However, the increased
opportunities this creates for post-hoc explanations are
– at least in the auditory domain – not yet met by a propor-
tional increase in rigorous conﬁrmatory results. For
endogenous attention, studies explicitly testing the
account report small and sometimes conﬂicting eﬀects
(Chennu et al., 2013; Hsu et al., 2014; Auksztulewiczthere evidence for predictive coding in auditory cortex?. Neuroscience
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8 August 2017and Friston, 2015a; Garrido et al., 2017). For exogenous
attention, precision-weighting oﬀers a compelling expla-
nation for the enhancing eﬀect of regularity (Barascud
et al., 2016; Sohoglu and Chait, 2016b; Hsu et al.,
2015; Southwell et al., 2017); however, the direct conse-
quence of this claim (that regularity should be salient) was
consistently not found (Southwell et al., 2017). More
research is needed to test and potentially revise the
notion of auditory precision-weighting, and to explore dif-
ferences with vision where it may apply more readily (e.g.
Kok et al., 2012; Zhao et al., 2013).
The rhythms of prediction
In systems neuroscience, distinct oscillatory signatures
for feedforward processing (operating mainly via the
gamma band) and feedback processing (using alpha
and mainly beta bands) have been demonstrated in
considerable detail (van Kerkoerle et al., 2014;
Buschman and Miller, 2007). In standard PC, this oscilla-
tory asymmetry is hypothesized to be linked to the func-
tional asymmetry between (upward) errors and
(backward) predictions. In other words, predictions and
errors should have distinct oscillatory signatures (Arnal
and Giraud, 2012; Bastos et al., 2012). However, evi-
dence for this claim has remained indirect (see Arnal
et al., 2011 for a demonstration in speech perception;
van Pelt et al., 2016 in causal cognition).
Recently, Sedley et al. (2016) provided more direct
evidence, using a simple parametric task to generate
auditory stimuli while recording local ﬁeld potentials using
ECoG. Three human subjects listened to short (300-ms)
sequences of harmonic complexes of which only the fun-
damental frequency varied. In any given trial there was a
7/8 chance that f0 would be sampled from the same
Gaussian population, and a 1/8 chance that it would be
sampled from a new one. Assuming that subjects uncon-
sciously tracked the statistics, the authors used a Bayes-
optimal inversion of their generative algorithm to calculate
trial-by-trial estimates of four key inferential variables:
prediction error, surprise, prediction change and predic-
tion precision (where surprise is the precision-weighted
variant of prediction error). The authors correlated these
estimates with a time–frequency analysis of the LFP
trace. As expected, the authors found that gamma was
correlated with surprise (more than prediction error).
Moreover, prediction change correlated with an increase
in beta-band around 400 ms. Finally, and not explicitly
predicted by PC, the authors found signiﬁcant correlations
between the alpha band and precision of predictions,
although this eﬀect was less pronounced than that in
the beta and gamma band.
Among the earlier discussed studies, only Fujioka
et al. (2009) reported eﬀects similarly compatible with
PC. There, an oscillatory stimulus (a beat) induced an
oscillatory modulation of the beta band that was time-
locked to the beat. When a tone was omitted, the immedi-
ate decrease in beta-power was not observed, suggesting
that the beta-power may have been an oscillatory expec-
tation. Moreover, omissions did induce short gamma
bursts, characteristic of stimuli (or surprise). Other stud-
ies, however, did not report clear oscillatory dissociations.Please cite this article in press as: Heilbron M, Chait M. Great expectations: Is
(2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroscience.2017.07.061Signatures of prediction in the beta-band, for instance,
were absent in Du¨rschmid et al. (2016) who reported
ECoG recordings to predictable and unpredictable devi-
ants. The authors made sure they compared electrodes
with similar sensitivity for diﬀerent frequency bands, and
nevertheless only found eﬀects seemed in the high-
gamma band (>60 Hz) and at low frequencies related
to evoked potentials, but hardly in between.
El Karoui et al. (2015) presented ECoG recordings of
patients performing a local–global paradigm and found a
decrease in sustained beta power after global mis-
matches (which would arguably involve more prediction-
change). However, the global deviants were also the
behavioral target, confounding attention and prediction,
and making interpretation diﬃcult. Finally, Todorovic
et al. (2015) found eﬀects of attention and expectation
only in the beta-band, which decreased in power after
unexpected tones, but only if attention was directed to
another, earlier time window.
To summarize, evidence for distinct oscillatory
signatures of prediction and error processing is limited,
indirect and mixed: only two of six studies revealed
spectral patterns compatible with the predictions of PC.
Methodological diﬀerences make it diﬃcult to draw an
unequivocal conclusion on the existence of oscillatory
diﬀerences between prediction and error processing.
Given the increasing evidence for laminar diﬀerences
between alpha/beta and gamma band dominance (e.g.
Scheeringa et al., 2016), oscillatory diﬀerences are a
potential tool to test the standard implementation of PC,
and future studies using parametric methods like Sedley
et al. (2016) may oﬀer much needed conﬁrmatory evi-
dence. However, simply interpreting diﬀerent bands as
reﬂecting diﬀerent variables without employing a paramet-
ric approach to calculate the relevant variables on a trial-
by-trial basis seems empirically unwarranted given the
highly variable results of studies without such a model-
based approach.
EFFECTIVE CONNECTIVITY – CLUES FROM
DCM
Measurement in neuroscience typically allows for high
spatial or high temporal resolution. Accordingly, many
studies probe the ‘when’ or ‘where’ of neural responses.
However, this provides little insight in how responses
emerge. Causal modeling techniques attempt to
overcome this by estimating changes in causal
inﬂuences between sources underlying eﬀects of
interest. One of these techniques – Dynamic Causal
Modelling (Friston et al., 2003) – has been extensively
used to test predictive coding, especially in relation to
the MMN. Since DCM is a theory-driven method which
makes several enabling assumptions, we will brieﬂy reca-
pitulate the ideas behind DCM before discussing the stud-
ies that used it.
DCM for MEG and EEG
DCM is a hypothesis testing framework, which works by
predicting neural responses based on several
hypotheses, and then comparing these predictions tothere evidence for predictive coding in auditory cortex?. Neuroscience
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8 August 2017the data. Predictions are generated by combining a
neuronal and an observational model. In DCM for M/
EEG (Kiebel et al., 2006, 2008), the observational model
is a lead ﬁeld as used in source reconstruction, which
maps hidden dipoles in the skull to observable deﬂections
at the scalp. DCM goes beyond this ‘common’ reconstruc-
tion method by using a neuronal model to explicitly model
intracranial current ﬂow. Neuronal models in DCM for M/
EEG (see Moran et al., 2013 for review) are mostly mass
models, which do not capture the complex dynamics
between large numbers of individual neurons (as found
in the skull) but rather the simpler dynamics between
massively synchronized populations of neurons (as mea-
surable at the scalp). Typically, a region is described with
three or four sub-populations of inhibitory and excitatory
neurons (each modeled using an ordinary second-order
diﬀerential equation) that operate as a dampened linear
oscillator (David and Friston, 2003; David et al., 2006).
In DCM, hypotheses are embodied as architectures:
cortical sources connected in a speciﬁc, directional way.
Responses can be generated by injecting a Gaussian
impulse into one source (e.g. A1), after which the
current ﬂow ensuing from the network is passed through
the lead ﬁeld to generate observational patterns for the
modality in use (EEG or MEG). Between-trial eﬀects are
modeled as changes in extrinsic or intrinsic connectivity.
Extrinsic connectivity refers to coupling strength
between regions, is modeled by directional coupling
parameters, and can be thought of as inter-regional
synaptic modulation (c.f. learning). Intrinsic connectivity
refers to the strength with which a signal is propagatedFig. 4. Graphical speciﬁcation of connectivity models underlying the MMN as
frontotemporal network, combined with neuronal excitability modulations in A
and modalities (Garrido et al., 2008, 2009a; Phillips et al., 2015, 2016; Ch
including left IFG and frontal ‘expectancy inputs’ which was found to best expl
or omissions (Phillips et al., 2015, 2016; Chennu et al., 2016).
Please cite this article in press as: Heilbron M, Chait M. Great expectations: Is
(2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroscience.2017.07.061within a region. It is adjusted by changing the maximum
ﬁring rate of excitatory populations, and can be thought
of as changing the excitability of a region (c.f.
adaptation). Ultimately, the architecture that can most
readily explain the eﬀect – yielding the best ﬁt with the
least complexity – is deemed most likely.
By virtue of these assumptions, DCM aims to provide
an in silico environment for testing hypotheses about both
the neural architecture underlying experimental data, and
the changes within this architecture that best explain
between-trial eﬀects of interest.Dynamic Causal modeling of MMN
The ﬁrst application of DCM to MEG and EEG is
described in Garrido et al. (2007a,b) who modeled the dif-
ference between standard and deviant ERPs from an
oddball paradigm. Garrido et al. (2007a,b) found that the
diﬀerence between standard and deviant responses was
best explained by bidirectional connectivity changes
between Heschl’s Gyrus (A1), superior temporal gyrus
(STG) and right inferior frontal gyrus (rIFG). Garrido
et al. (2007b) replicated this basic result at the group-
level and veriﬁed that backward modulations were espe-
cially important for explaining ERP diﬀerences at later
latencies (200–400 ms).
Having established these foundational results,
Garrido et al. (2008) used DCM to compare theoretical
accounts of MMN. In the study, the authors modeled a
series of responses from the roving standard paradigm,
from deviant (ﬁrst tone) to standard (last tone). They thensuggested by DCM. Left: connectivity modulations in an asymmetric
1, was shown to best explain the MMN across a variety of paradigms
ennu et al., 2016; Barascud et al., 2016). Right: connectivity model
ain MMN responses to temporal irregularities (duration and silent gap)
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8 August 2017compared which MMN–hypothesis could explain the
associated ERP diﬀerences – and thus the diﬀerential
MMN – best. Each MMN hypothesis was embodied as a
diﬀerent variation of the frontotemporal architecture out-
lined above (see Fig. 4). The adaptation hypothesis was
modeled as a network in which only the excitability of
A1 varied over trials. The model-adjustment hypothesis
(which explains the MMN as a fronto-temporal memory-
adjustment; cf. Na¨a¨ta¨nen et al., 1978, 2007) was modeled
as a network in which only the between-region connectiv-
ity varied between trials. Finally, predictive coding was
embodied in a model in which both the excitability of A1
and inter-regional connectivity varied. The idea was that
PC incorporates both adaptation and model adjustment
(see also Section Predictive coding and MMN) – in this
view, changes in excitability of A1 and fronto-temporal
coupling are expressions of belief-updating at diﬀerent
hierarchical levels (intra-regional microcircuitry versus
inter-regional network connectivity). Model comparison
showed that the hybrid PC model explained the ERP dif-
ferences best. The superiority of hybrid model was later
replicated in a study using the ‘classic’ frequency oddball
(Garrido et al., 2009a).
Temporal deviants and top-down predictions
Within the same model space, Phillips et al. (2015) repli-
cated this result using MEG and stimuli that deviated
across various dimensions, such as frequency, intensity,
or duration. To study all these deviant dimensions, the
authors used an optimized oddball paradigm (Na¨a¨ta¨nen
et al., 2004), in which each block starts with several stan-
dard tones, after which standards start alternating with dif-
ferent deviants – e.g. standard, frequency-deviant,
standard, duration-deviant, standard, etc. First, within
the model space of Garrido et al. (2008, 2009a), the
model with forward, backward and intrinsic modulations
in A1 was conﬁrmed to ‘win’ for all dimensions. Subse-
quently, the model space was extended to include archi-
tectures with left IFG and models with an additional,
frontal input. Usually, Gaussian impulse functions are
models of sensory inputs, and are only ‘injected’ at thala-
morecipient regions. By contrast, Phillips et al. (2015)
located a second input at IFG (‘expectancy inputs’; see
Fig. 4). Interestingly, models that included a prefrontal
‘expectation’ input only provided a better ﬁt for temporal
deviants – that is, either tones containing a short silent
gap in the center, or tones that deviated in duration. Mod-
els with an additional IFG were more likely across all stim-
ulus dimensions.
In a follow-up study, Phillips et al. (2016) ﬁrst repli-
cated these ﬁndings by performing the same analysis on
a new MEG recording of 50 subjects. They then extended
the analyses to ECoG data. As explained above, in DCM
for MEG and EEG current ﬂow ensuing from the network
is passed through a lead ﬁeld to generate observational
patterns speciﬁc to M/EEG. As this additional model
may introduce uncertainty, it is important to verify whether
inverting a DCM without observation model (i.e. using sig-
nals directly from cortex) yields similar results. The
authors recruited two patients: one with electrodes over
right IFG and STG, and one with electrodes over leftPlease cite this article in press as: Heilbron M, Chait M. Great expectations: Is
(2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroscience.2017.07.061IFG and STG. The ECoG DCM results matched earlier
DCM results with respect to the relative importance of for-
ward/backward interactions. However, the frontal expec-
tancy input ‘won’ only in the patient with left-lateralized
electrodes. Strikingly, this asymmetry was also found in
the MEG results: temporal deviants were best explained
by models with a left, rather than bilateral, IFG input. This
apparent lateralization is remarkable and calls for a repli-
cation, since earlier studies did not consider left IFG a
‘main MMN generator’ (Opitz et al., 2002; Garrido et al.,
2008, 2009a,b; Chennu et al., 2016). Alternatively, the
eﬀect may be related to diﬀerences in electrode locations
of left versus right IFG. This artifact would be propagated
to the MEG results because the coordinates from the
ECoG electrodes were used as source coordinates in
the observation model.
Finally, Chennu et al. (2016) performed a DCM analy-
sis on MEG and EEG data from a local–global paradigm
that included omissions. In two conditions, participants
either counted uncommon sequences (attend-auditory)
or performed an unrelated visual task (attend-visual).
For deviant tones, the ‘classic’ architecture used by
(Garrido et al., 2007a,b, 2008, 2009a) best explained
the data both in the attended and unattended condition.
For the omission responses, by contrast, an architecture
that included bilateral IFG and a frontal expectancy input
(which replaced the thalamic sensory input) best
explained the data, which is compatible with the idea that
omission responses reﬂect top-down prediction (rather
than prediction error).
Discussion
To summarize, DCM studies show that models which
modulate both A1 excitability and fronto-temporal
connectivity explain deviant responses in oddball
paradigms (Garrido et al., 2007a,b, 2009a) and variations
thereof (Garrido et al., 2008; Phillips et al., 2015, 2016;
Chennu et al., 2016) better than models that modulate
only A1 excitability or fronto-temporal connectivity. More-
over, responses to tones that deviate temporally, or are
omitted altogether, are best explained by models with
frontal ‘expectation inputs’ which replace (Chennu et al.,
2016) or augment (Phillips et al., 2015, 2016) the thalamic
sensory input.
These patterns of eﬀects are in line with PC by
describing MMN not only via A1 adaptation or long-
range connectivity, but via a mechanism that combines
both. Moreover, an interesting analogy might be drawn
between the need for frontal inputs to explain temporal
deviants in DCM (Phillips et al., 2015, 2016) and the fact
that temporal deviants constitute a key diﬀerence
between network-level MMN, which is sensitive to tempo-
ral deviants, and neuron-level SSA, which is not (Khouri
and Nelken, 2015). Although this post-hoc analogy would
require further investigation, the fact that only intracellular
recordings and DCM appear to consistently distinguish
temporal deviants from other deviants illustrates the
potential of the technique to extend beyond traditional
analysis of non-invasive data.
However, the DCM studies have several limitations.
The ﬁrst issue is that DCM relies on assumptions andthere evidence for predictive coding in auditory cortex?. Neuroscience
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8 August 2017simpliﬁcations which are not fully validated. The neural
mass models used in most DCM for M/EEG studies are
even abstracted to such degree that some parameters
don’t have obvious physiological substrates. One
response to this is to develop more complex models
with more biologically meaningful parameters (Moran
et al., 2013); an approach that is showing promising
results (Gilbert et al., 2016). However, this does not yet
address the issue of validation. Although initial studies
have established the face validity of DCM for M/EEG
(Garrido et al., 2007a,b, 2009a,b) and the extensively
replicated MMN results demonstrate predictive validity
(Phillips et al., 2015, 2016; Chennu et al., 2016) much
needs to be done before DCM can be said to have con-
struct validity. Combining diﬀerent techniques, such as
in Phillips et al. (2016), will be critical in this process. Note
however that Phillips et al. (2016) only partially validated
the observation model, which was arguably the least
controversial.
A second issue is to what extent these results support
predictive coding. Even if we fully accept the network
modulations suggested by DCM, this doesn’t mean that
these changes necessarily reﬂect predictive coding, or
even a single underlying mechanism. Indeed, it is
diﬃcult to see why changes in A1 excitability and STG-
IFG connectivity should be uniquely characteristic of
predictive coding. This problem is reinforced by the fact
that the discussed studies have mostly used designs in
which expectation and adaptation are confounded,
which makes arbitrating between predictive and non-
predictive interpretations even more diﬃcult. As such,
while the discussed studies constitute exciting
methodological developments in the analysis of non-
invasive electrophysiological data, their strength as
empirical support for predictive coding theory seems
rather limited.1606
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In this review we aimed to provide a comprehensive
empirical evaluation of ﬁve key assumptions of
predictive coding theory in the context of auditory
pattern processing. Findings from animal, human and
computational neuroscience provide converging
evidence for the fundamental inﬂuence of expectations
on neural responses and speciﬁcally the notion of
prediction error as a model of sensory responsiveness
(Assumption 2). Studies on unexpectedly omitted stimuli
provide support for the anticipatory, predictive nature of
these expectancy eﬀects (Assumption 1). Moreover, the
dissociation of expectancy eﬀects at diﬀerent
hierarchical levels in both animal and human literature
seems suggestive of the hierarchical nesting of
predictions, as postulated by predictive coding theory
and implied by Dynamic Causal Modeling results
(Assumption 1), although more experiments are needed
that explicitly manipulate multiple, nested regularities.
As to the remaining three assumptions, the picture is
less clear. Critically, for the existence of separate
prediction and error neurons residing in distinct cortical
layers (Assumption 3), there is currently no evidence inPlease cite this article in press as: Heilbron M, Chait M. Great expectations: Is
(2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroscience.2017.07.061the auditory domain in line with this idea (but see Bell
et al., 2016; Kok et al., 2016, for recent studies in vision).
The recent development to conceptualize attention as the
weighting of sensory input by sensory precision (Assump-
tion 4), has provided elegant post-hoc explanations for a
broad range of phenomena, but has yet to provide rigor-
ous a priori conﬁrmatory results. Finally, the dissociation
between diﬀerent frequency bands and computational
variables in PC (Assumption 5) has been demonstrated
by one study which explicitly estimated the variables on
a trial-by-trial basis; studies that did not use such a
model-based approach however mostly failed to ﬁnd sim-
ilar associations. Looking to the future, progress in the
ﬁeld will critically depend on investigating these assump-
tions in order to test and revise or falsify speciﬁc imple-
mentations of PC. Doing so will require closer
collaboration between sub-disciplines, in particular
between animal and human research, where methodolog-
ical and conceptual diﬀerences currently create interpre-
tational diﬃculties. Finally, to test crucial theoretical
distinctions (e.g. prediction error versus precision-
weighted prediction error) there is an ongoing need for
computationally explicit analyses in both human and ani-
mal neuroscience.
In short, over the past decade a broad range of
ﬁndings in auditory neuroscience have pointed to a
fundamental role of expectations and prediction errors in
sensory processing. Going from these ﬁndings to the
alternative, overarching framework envisioned by PC,
however, requires a number of theoretical steps
between which the empirical links are currently missing.
Uncovering, revising or potentially refuting these
‘missing links’ is diﬃcult but feasible, and provides an
exciting neuroscientiﬁc challenge for the years to come.UNCITED REFERENCES
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